ContentKeeper cgi-bin/ck/changepw.cgi Cleartext Password Disclosure
Release Date:
22-Sep-2006
Software:
ContentKeeper Technologies - ContentKeeper
http://www.contentkeeper.com/
"ContentKeeper is an industry leading Internet content filter that allows
organisations to monitor, manage, control & secure staff access to
Internet resources."
Versions affected:
ContentKeeper 123.25 and below.
Vulnerability discovered:
A design flaw in the user administration interface reveals account
passwords inside the HTML source code. Any authenticated user with
appropriate access to the user administration page may use this
information to compromise the accounts on other systems.
Vulnerability impact:
Low - Unauthorised password disclosure may result in other system account
breaches where the revealed password has been reused.
Vulnerability information
The appliance is administered by use of a web browser HTML based front
end. Authenticated users have access to the account administration page,
whereby they can administer existing usernames, reset passwords, create
and delete accounts etc. The appliance does not hash the existing user
passwords. When the page is requested, the plaintext password for each
account is inserted into the password input value of the FORM element
and sent to the client.
Example:
https://contentkeeperbox/cgi-bin/ck/changepw.cgi
This will return all user details. By viewing the page source,
the password of each account is revealed.
E.g. for user 'root' with a password of 'it_isAs3cret':
<form>
<input name="username" type="text" value="root">Username:
<input type="password" name="password" value="it_isAs3cret">Password:
..
<input name="username" type="text" value="rootBackup">Username:
<input type="password" name="password" value="IamF0rgetful">Password:
</form>
It may be possible to extract this information from the browser cache,
however the HTML content is set to expire immediately.
Solution:
None yet, do not reuse passwords. Future versions may hash the value.
Credit:
Patrick Webster
Disclosure timeline:
15-Mar-2006 - Discovered during quick audit - common design flaw.
08-Jun-2006 - Sent to ContentKeeper support.
12-Jun-2006 - Vendor response, update expected July 2006.
22-Sep-2006 - Public disclosure.
22-Sep-2006
Software:
ContentKeeper Technologies - ContentKeeper
http://www.contentkeeper.com/
"ContentKeeper is an industry leading Internet content filter that allows
organisations to monitor, manage, control & secure staff access to
Internet resources."
Versions affected:
ContentKeeper 123.25 and below.
Vulnerability discovered:
A design flaw in the user administration interface reveals account
passwords inside the HTML source code. Any authenticated user with
appropriate access to the user administration page may use this
information to compromise the accounts on other systems.
Vulnerability impact:
Low - Unauthorised password disclosure may result in other system account
breaches where the revealed password has been reused.
Vulnerability information
The appliance is administered by use of a web browser HTML based front
end. Authenticated users have access to the account administration page,
whereby they can administer existing usernames, reset passwords, create
and delete accounts etc. The appliance does not hash the existing user
passwords. When the page is requested, the plaintext password for each
account is inserted into the password input value of the FORM element
and sent to the client.
Example:
https://contentkeeperbox/cgi-bin/ck/changepw.cgi
This will return all user details. By viewing the page source,
the password of each account is revealed.
E.g. for user 'root' with a password of 'it_isAs3cret':
<form>
<input name="username" type="text" value="root">Username:
<input type="password" name="password" value="it_isAs3cret">Password:
..
<input name="username" type="text" value="rootBackup">Username:
<input type="password" name="password" value="IamF0rgetful">Password:
</form>
It may be possible to extract this information from the browser cache,
however the HTML content is set to expire immediately.
Solution:
None yet, do not reuse passwords. Future versions may hash the value.
Credit:
Patrick Webster
Disclosure timeline:
15-Mar-2006 - Discovered during quick audit - common design flaw.
08-Jun-2006 - Sent to ContentKeeper support.
12-Jun-2006 - Vendor response, update expected July 2006.
22-Sep-2006 - Public disclosure.
